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No one intends to establish a market economy: such a 
state of affairs comes into being through the individual 
bargaining arrangements of people exchanging goods and 
services to maximise their advantages and minimise their 
deprivations. 
(MacRae, 1974:73) 
BacKgRoUND
At the peak of the marketisation surge in uk public 
utilities and services in 1994, the senior Department 
of Education and Science official who had been 
in charge of higher education policy throughout 
the 1980s wrote: ‘For my own part, I have always 
found it hard to discern any clarity of theme or 
practice which would justify an assertion that a 
‘market approach’… … was being pursued’ (Bird, 
1994). In keeping with the English tradition of 
philosophical and policy pragmatism, theoretical 
discussion of markets in higher education has 
tended to follow policy rather than pave the way 
for it. For most of the two and a quarter centuries 
since Adam Smith wrote ‘The Wealth of Nations’ 
market transactions have been treated as the natural 
form of economic intercourse and the task of 
government intervention has been regulation to 
prevent the worst excesses of market behaviour. It 
is the contention of this paper that British higher 
education stumbled into a closely regulated higher 
education market through a series of ad hoc 
responses by universities and government to 
immediate problems and there are many loose ends 
and unanticipated consequences. 
The United Kingdom was one of the first 
countries to adopt the new public management 
policies of the 1980s and 1990s. The relatively slow 
growth of the uk economy throughout the forty 
years following World War Two, compared with 
most other oecd countries exacerbated by the 
world economic depression of the later 1970s 
brought about a severe crisis of confidence in what 
had for a third of a century come to be known as 
the progressive consensus over social welfare and 
public control over the provision of public services 
and utilities. The Conservative government elected 
in 1979 had one overriding aim: to lower the near 
hyperinflationary price rises of the preceding few 
years and to do so by reducing public expenditure. 
Higher education was initially a bit player and 
subsequently an incidental actor in the dramas 
of the 1980s that ended with its transformation 
following the 1988 Education Reform Act and the 
1992 Higher and Further Education Acts.
However, as institutions, British universities 
provided fertile soil for the growth of market forms 
of organisation and entrepreneurial behaviour. 
First they were autonomous property owning 
institutions with their legal independence 
guaranted by Royal Charter1 or Parliamentary 
Statute. This gave them considerable independence 
from direct governmental or Parliamentary 
intervention. Each university was fully responsible 
for the management of its own financial affairs 
which meant that financial survival was not 
guaranteed. Universities also had a very high level 
of discretionary powers in their academic affairs. 
They appointed their own staff, recruited their own 
students, decided their own curricula and awarded 
their own degrees. They were subject only to the 
constraints imposed by their Charters and these 
were couched in very general terms. Furthermore, 
British universities throughout the twentieth 
century, shared with their counterparts in most 
Western countries, the belief that their academic 
The Higher Education Market in the United Kingdom
1. The legal basis of the most recent generation of universities, designated 
in 1993 out of former polytechnics and colleges, is Parliamentary Statute. 
For practical purposes the difference is small, though the academic staff of 
the ‘new’ universities have far less influence at the top levels of institutional 
governance than in the older universities (Shattock 2002).25
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staff should undertake both teaching grounded in 
high scholarship and research at the cutting edge of 
knowledge. However, after the big expansion of the 
late 1960s it became clear that government policy 
criteria for the distribution of research funds must 
differ from those for teaching. Finally, although 
in 1980, universities received most of their funds 
from the government they were required to render 
little account of the use of these funds. It was the 
realisation by government in the 1980s that it could 
set conditions on the use of the funds it provided 
that has been at the heart of much of the friction 
between universities and government in recent years.
In economic terms British Universities 
remain independent, non-profit, multi-product 
enterprises whose core business is the creation 
and dissemination of knowledge. They decide their 
own profile of outputs and the processes they use 
to produce them. They depend very heavily on 
public funds but they are not legally required to 
do so. Their status as charitable foundations does 
not permit them to make profits but they have full 
discretionary powers over any financial surplus they 
achieve. Until 1980 virtually no use was made of 
this power because universities were assured of an 
incremental rise in funds from the government year 
by year. 
Government became seriously involved in the 
funding of these enterprises only after the first 
World War and the dominant source of finance 
only after the second World War. At that time, in 
the late 1940s, partly because of the experiences 
of Nazism and Fascism, the mainstream political 
ideology in the West was strongly in favour of 
academic freedom and decentralised control of 
educational institutions. The ugc 2 system enabled 
universities to be financed largely by government 
but to remain free from political involvement 
in the management of their academic affairs and 
their internal resource allocation. Governments 
made grants to the system as a whole and not to 
any individual university. The ugc, whose twenty 
members were broadly representative of university 
interests, was responsible for allocating money to 
individual universities and the government took 
no overt part in this. The ugc applied the principle 
of institutional autonomy to its own allocations 
to individual universities: they were single “block” 
grants made on a more or less incremental basis 
for five years at a time, with only a very general 
indication of the bases on which the grant had been 
calculated. Universities were free to spend their 
recurrent income as they wished, provided they 
remained within the provisions of their charters, 
which were framed in very broad terms. Until 1988 
successive governments accepted that their main 
role was to subsidise universities and, from time 
to time, to exhort them to behave in accordance 
with what the government considered to be the 
public interest. However, it was largely left to each 
university to decide whether it would heed the 
government’s exhortations.3
In many ways the period be  tween 1945 and 1980 
was a golden age for British universities and the 
academic staff working in them. They were funded 
generously by the state as institutions whose 
main function was to form the new generation of 
national leaders in the public service, in scientific 
research and the liberal professions.4 The state met 
most of their costs and made very few demands 
on them. Academic criteria alone dominated their 
decision making in both teaching and research. 
A generation of university teachers came to 
believe that this was the natural order of things 
and injudiciously assumed that it could continue 
indefinitely. One example of the complacency of 
this belief was the view, expressed by some in 
universities in 1981, that all members of the ugc 
should have resigned en masse rather than accept 
the severe financial cuts imposed by a recently 
elected government with a large parliamentary 
majority (See Kogan and Kogan, 1984).
TRaNsfoRMaTIoN 
However, the transformation of United Kingdom 
higher education in the 1980s cannot be understood 
on the basis of the universities alone. From the late 
nineteenth century onwards there had developed 
alternative institutions of postsecondary education 
concentrating mainly on technical and vocational 
training for young people from relatively poor 
families. These institutions were the responsibility 
of local education authorities. 
One early indication of government impatience 
with some consequences of university independence 
was the reorganisation of these disparate colleges 
into a separate sector of higher education directly 
under public control in the late 1960s, contrary 
to the recommendations of the Robbins Report.5 
This gave rise to the binary system in which 
the polytechnics and other colleges of higher 
2. The University Grants Committee, consisting largely of members of the 
academic staff of universities, advised the government on university needs and 
distributed government grants to universities.
3. For a useful account of the ugc in its heyday see Shattock and Berdahl (1984). 
4. Although the generosity became somewhat less liberal after the world 
oil crisis of the 1970s and the emergence of some unemployment amongst 
recent graduates.
5. A major government sponsored enquiry into the future of higher education, 
which published its report in 1963. One of its prime recommendations was 
that in due course all major higher education institutions should become 
autonomous universities.G
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9. A very readable, if somewhat polemical account of these events and their 
immediate effect on universities is given in Kogan and Kogan (1983). 
10. A new specialist literature on higher education management began to 
emerge, for example Lockwood & Davies (1985) Jarratt Report (1984).
education were to be funded primarily as teaching 
institutions in which applied research was to be 
subsidiary to their core function of expanding 
student participation. However, from the viewpoint 
of central government policy implementation, local 
authority control was in practice little better than 
the autonomy of the university sector, since the 
polytechnics were to remain under the control 
of the local education authorities which were 
themselves, at the time, centres of independent 
political power. 
By 1980 the public sector of higher education 
was becoming large enough and politically and 
economically strong enough to challenge the 
monopoly power of the universities. Many of the 
developments of the following two decades can best 
be understood in terms of the competition between 
two different conceptions of the underlying 
purposes of higher education.6
The 1980s was a decade of radical change. But 
it was change initiated by wider economic policy 
choices rather than a result of carefully debated 
ideas about the finance of higher education. The 
government was elected on the basis of promises 
to reduce inflation and to reduce taxation and 
proposed to achieve this by reducing what it saw 
as waste in the public services resulting from 
excessively bureaucratic forms of organisation. In 
many public services this resulted in fundamental 
changes in their structures: nationalised industries 
and public utilities were privatised, and internal 
markets were imposed on others.7 In the university 
sector consisting of autonomous institutions, such 
structural change was unnecessary. However, as 
part of a fight to wrest political power from the local 
authorities, in 1988 the government gave other 
higher education institutions a legal status similar 
to the universities. The rest could be achieved by 
keeping all higher education institutions short of 
money and manipulating the terms on which public 
funds were made available to them
Soon after the 1979 election the new government 
imposed massive public expenditure cuts and higher 
education’s share was the removal of all public 
subsidy in respect of students in higher whose 
permanent residence was outside the European 
Community.8 This removed about 6 per cent from 
the income of universities. In the following year this 
cut was followed by a further reduction of 10 per 
cent in the government grants to higher education 
institutions.9 Although these expenditure cuts 
were made purely for public expenditure reasons, 
they were a watershed in terms of their effects on 
universities and perceptions of appropriate forms of 
public finance for them. (Moore, 1987) A generation 
of academic staff and academic managers had 
learned to rely completely on annual incremental 
increases in government funding. The shock of the 
1981 cuts was traumatic. However, when faced with 
the realities of reduced expenditure and possible 
bankruptcy, some universities immediately began 
to exploit their independence and to develop a 
variety of forms of income generation as well 
as expenditure reduction. Among the strategies 
vigorously pursued by many universities from the 
early 1980s onwards were:
•	 Energetic	recruitment	of	full	fee	paying	foreign	
students;
•	 Maintenance	of	the	‘unit	of	resource’	(average	cost	
per student) by restricting student recruitment;
•	 Establishment	of	university	companies	to	sell	
teaching and research services; 
•	 Formalisation	of	consultancy	services	by	members	
of academic staffs and charging of full direct and 
indirect costs for any services provided;
•	 Creation	of	Science	and	Business	Parks;
•	 Renting	out	teaching	and	living	accommodation	
at times it was not required by students (Williams, 
1992).
Such explicit marketing activities, combined with 
financial stringency, raised a variety of management 
problems and instigated wide-ranging 
management changes in universities and colleges.10 
Traditional collegial styles of management were 
unable to cope with the much harsher financial 
environment and the realisation that government 
could no longer be relied on to guarantee the 
financial survival of any university. ‘Save half, raise 
half’ was the much cited response of Warwick 
University (e.g. in Williams 1992 and Clark 1997). 
Many others soon followed Warwick’s example. 
This immediately raised questions of how far it is 
appropriate for a university to go in generating 
income from any source that is not part of its 
core mission of scholarly teaching and research? 
Should income generation take precedence over 
other aspects of a university’s mission? How well 
6. Tyrell Burgess (19??) described these as the ‘service sector’ and the 
‘autonomous’ sectors of higher education: one driven by social and economic 
needs for qualified manpower, the other by the disinterested pursuit of 
‘scholarship’.
7. Amongst a large literature on this ‘new public management’ in the UK 
Power, 1997 and Pollitt 1999 are widely cited.
8. One sign that this was a hasty and ill thought out measure was the fact 
that initially it was intended to apply to European Community students as well. 
It was only when legal action was threatened that it was accepted that the 
Treaty of Rome required all students from within the Community to be treated 
on the same terms as United Kingdom students.27
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could activities that were undertaken primarily 
for income generation cohabit with traditional 
academic activities? One aspect of this debate 
that has still generates tensions in the academic 
profession is the extent to which success in income 
generating applied research and consultancy 
should supplement, or replace, traditional academic 
criteria in making staff appointments or promoting 
staff to senior positions.11 
Despite the problems, success in such ventures 
by several universities showed that they were able 
to generate supplementary income by responding to
market opportunities when it was necessary. 
No university was bankrupted by government 
expenditure reductions in the 1980s though some 
came near to it. (See Shattock 2003) One clear 
quantitative indicator of market success was that 
by the middle of the 1980s British Universities were 
recruiting more foreign students than they had in 
1979, the last year in which they were fully subsidised 
by the British government. 
However, there were some, examples of 
governments needing to bail out universities. One 
influential example that undoubtedly influenced 
government thinking when it was drafting the 1988 
Education Reform Act, was that many universities 
were unable to reduce their staffing levels in 
response to the expenditure reductions because 
they had given most of their teaching staff lifetime 
tenured contracts very early in their careers.12 
In 1983 the government had to set up a special 
early retirement scheme to allow universities to 
recompense staff for the loss of their lifetime tenure 
and this proved very expensive. Furthermore 
there was evidence that it was often the most able 
staff who could find employment outside the British 
university sector and were most likely to take 
advantage of the terms offered. This was one of the 
main reasons why the government removed the 
legal right of universities to offer lifetime tenured 
appointments in the 1988 Act. It may be seen as a 
further step in the regulation of a market oriented 
system, but it was also a response to a specific 
financial pressure.
However, the overall success of universities in 
dealing with financial stringency made possible 
the next major step by the government, which 
was to formalise the procedures that had evolved 
initially as a response to financial exigencies. The 
1988 Education Reform Act acknowledged the 
successful market performance of the universities. It 
transformed them from trusted providers of high-
level teaching and research into audited sellers of 
academic services. That this was the intention is 
confirmed in letters sent by the Secretary of State 
for Education and Science to the chairmen of the 
Universities Funding Council and the Polytechnics 
and Colleges Funding Council on the day the 
Education Reform Act passed into Law.
I shall look to the Council to develop funding 
arrangements which recognise the general principle 
that the public funds allocated to universities are in 
exchange for the provision of teaching and research 
and are conditional on their delivery.
I very much hope that it will seek ways of actively 
encouraging institutions to increase their private 
earnings so that the state’s share of institutions’ funding 
falls and the incentive to respond to the needs of 
students and employers is increased (Letter from the 
Secretary of State for Education and Science to the 
Chairman of the Universities Funding Council 31 
October 1988).
The Funding Councils responded to the first of 
these exhortations by instituting formula funding 
and a system of ‘financial memoranda’, in effect 
contracts with each university, which specified what 
was required from the money allocated, and the 
establishment of formula funding models that set 
‘prices’ for each student recruited by a university. 
Furthermore, unlike the former University Grants 
Committee the majority of the members of the new
Funding Councils inaugurated by the Act, were 
appointed by the government from outside 
universities.
fINaNcIaL INcENTIvEs aND THE acHIEvEMENT of Mass 
HIgHER EDUcaTIoN
By the late 1980s government policy was being 
influenced by the inauguration of the annual oecd 
statistical series Education at a Glance. These 
revealed authoritatively that uk rates of participation 
in higher education lagged well behind most oecd
countries. This and a growing belief in the 
importance of a well qualified labour force for 
success in the rapidly emerging knowledge society 
shifted government concern from saving money to
the need for expansion to underpin economic 
growth. Until 1988 the universities had claimed 
that further expansion must be achieved at existing 
levels of average cost per students, which the 
11. One solution that has been fairly widely adopted, especially but not solely 
in the universities that were created after 1992 has been to create parallel 
career paths in which specialists in various forms of income generation can 
earn high salaries but not senior academic titles. In some cases they have been 
academic titles as well. It is thought that this increases their respect by the more 
traditional academic profession. A more mundane problem was tax status. 
Legally, universities and colleges are charitable institutions. This gives them a 
variety of tax privileges provided they keep within the terms of their charitable 
status. However, if they start to make profits (and when does a surplus 
become a profit?) from their income generating activities, and particularly if 
this puts them into direct competition with private sector companies it may be 
seen as unfair competition and can lead to large tax demands. 
12. Here were economic reasons for this to achieve the necessary growth in 
staff numbers at reasonable immediate cost during the expansion of the late 
1960s. See Williams, Blackstone, Metcalfe 1983.G
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Treasury13 considered would be too expensive. 
(Bird 1994) The Department of Education and 
Science called the bluff of both parties. In 1989 the 
government transferred about 20 per cent of 
the core funding away from direct payments to 
institutions and used it to subsidise payment of fees
by students directly to their universities and 
polytechnics. In effect this was a student voucher 
scheme that covered about a quarter of the 
teaching costs of universities and colleges. The 
universities had by now become accustomed to the 
active recruitment of students from abroad and 
they began to apply their newly found marketing 
expertise to the recruitment of British (and eu) 
students at marginal costs. 
These two changes, formula funding based on 
student numbers and fee subsidy of at least a quarter 
of teaching costs, set the scene for an explosive 
expansion of student numbers. After more than a 
decade of financial stringency higher education 
institutions were short of cash and for the first time 
the polytechnics and colleges were able to take their 
own financial decisions. Additional students meant 
additional money. They responded to the changes in 
funding mechanisms by recruiting as many full cost 
students as the Funding Councils allowed, and then 
as many “fees only” students as they could find. 
The Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council, 
which existed from 1988 to 1992, accentuated these 
incentives by holding back up to 10 per cent of the 
funds available and held what was in affect an
auction. Each year polytechnics and colleges were 
invited to offer places for additional students 
and convincing bids at the lowest price received 
additional resources up to the point at which the 
money made available by the government ran 
out. In the following year the average allocation 
per student was reduced to the average after the 
bidding was completed, thus reducing standard 
income per student for all institutions whether or 
not they had participated in the bidding process. 
The result was a 75 per cent increase in new 
first-degree enrolments of between 1988 and 1993 
with many institutions doubling their enrolments 
over the 5-year period. One consequence was a 
very sharp fall in the average income from public 
funds per student which fell by some 25 per cent 
over the same 5 year period. Only now the debate 
began about whether piecework buying of teaching 
services was an appropriate way of financing 
universities and if so what kind of regulation of the 
market was needed. At the same time, and partly 
as a consequence of the declining income from 
additional uk (and eu) students all universities and 
colleges continued to exploit even more vigorously 
the overseas student market.
The expansion policy of the early 1990s was so 
successful (see Annexe) that by the middle of the 
decade the government was becoming concerned 
on two counts. One was a fear higher education 
institutions14 were showing insufficient regard for
quality as student numbers exploded at ever 
decreasing unit costs. The other was that, despite 
the partial replacement of student maintenance 
grants by loans and the fact that through the 
marginal cost pricing mechanism described above 
each additional student was costing public funds 
less than the previous average cost per student, 
the expansion was so rapid that total government 
expenditure commitments to higher education were 
growing at an unacceptable rate. In 1995, therefore, 
the expansion policy was reversed, a clamp was 
imposed on further uncontrolled expansion and a 
university became liable to a “fine” for every student 
it recruited above the target number set by the 
Higher Education Funding Council. 
The ceiling on student numbers lasted until 1998 
when the new Labour government reversed the
policy of restricted enrolments and began to 
encourage further expansion, a policy development 
that culminated in February 2003 when a major 
government White Paper confirmed that 
National economic imperatives support our target to 
increase participation in higher education towards 50 
per cent of those aged 18-30 by the end of the decade. 
Participation in England is already 43 per cent (DfES 
2003, 57). 
However, the government is discouraging expansion 
of traditional three year university degrees. The 
White paper also announced that:
We want to see expansion in two-year, work-focused 
foundation degrees; and in mature students in the 
workforce developing their skills (ibid, 60)
Then Higher Education Funding Council for England 
has been instructed to concentrate additional funding 
for teaching on two year ‘foundation degrees’.
Each university and college is set target numbers 
of students each year and is paid a ‘price’ for each 
student recruited up to this target.15 The quality of 
the education provided is monitored by the Quality 
Assurance Agency. Unless a course is deemed to 
reach an acceptable standard the funds provided 
for that course may be withheld. In practice this 
13. Ministry of Finance. 
14. By this time, following the passage of the 1992 Higher and Further 
Education Act, (which can be seen as an addendum to the 1988 Act) the 
great majority of students were in institutions called universities. 
15. There are 4 price bands medicine, laboratory subjects, part laboratory 
subjects, and other subjects. 29
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sanction has not been used directly because 
universities have discontinued the very small number
of courses that are deemed not to have reached the
required standard. At the other end of the spectrum 
university departments whose courses are judged 
by the qaa to reach a very high standard may be 
given higher target student numbers, and hence 
higher potential income from the funding councils. 
For research each university is given a basic 
allocation determined by the quantity and quality 
of its research as determined by a 4 year ‘research 
assessment exercise’ in which their research during 
the previous four years, and potential for the future, 
are peer reviewed. This is another feature of 
contemporary English higher education where 
the market is regulated by government influenced 
collective decisions. Each university department is 
given a score from 1 to 7 depending on the extent 
to which a national peer review panel deems its 
research to have met national and international 
standards during the previous four years. This part
of the exercise is based largely on academic 
criteria.16 However, the formula which converts 
of these scores into cash depends very heavily 
on government policy and fierce bargaining 
between universities. Appendix table X shows the 
current main coefficients of the formulae. Any 
department with a score of less than 417 in the 
last research assessment exercise receives no basic 
research funding. Conversely a medical department 
with a score of 5* receives per member of staff 
about 5.4 times as much per member of staff` as a 
history department with a score of 4. Obviously the 
universities with many high scoring departments 
argue for this weighting to be increased and those 
with lower scores seek to have the gradient made 
flatter. During the twenty year period in which the 
research assessment exercise has been in operation 
this gradient has become considerably steeper thus 
concentrating available research funds in fewer 
universities; the 2003 White Paper proposes to make 
it steeper still. 
Since the mid-1990s higher education institutions 
have also been eligible to receive ‘third leg funding’ 
from the higher education funding councils which is 
broadly intended to provided a basis for work that 
serves business and the community other than 
through academic teaching and research –short 
training courses, consultancy etc. All universities 
and colleges are eligible to receive such funds but
they must be bid for and are allocated on a 
competitive basis depending on the amount of effort 
the university appears to be willing to put into this 
range of activities.18 These funds are at present very 
small in relation to those for teaching and research 
but the 2003 White Paper has announced that they 
will expand considerably over the next few years 
(but will remain tiny compared with mainstream 
academic research.19
Although the principles underlying the funding 
of teaching and research and third stream activities 
are easy to state each of the broad streams is itself 
a network of trickles of funds, four price bands for
teaching subjects, eighty research assessment 
categories and individual bids for third leg funds. 
The details of the formulae and procedures involved 
are complex20 and it is partly through manipulation 
of the small print of the formulae that government 
policy is implemented in practice. For a university, 
determining the appropriate strategy to maximise 
institutional income and safeguard it in the future
are a major responsibility of any senior management 
team and governing body. Long term academic 
reputation, day-to-day cash flow, career development 
of staff, student learning and student welfare, the 
state of the buildings and equipment and relations 
with the local, national and global communities must 
all be balanced. 
THE REgULaTIoN of TEacHINg QUaLITy
The new funding mechanism introduced by the 
1988 Act was intended to stimulate expansion but 
the extent of its success in doing so was entirely 
unexpected. It was appreciated, however, that 
expansion combined with reduced public funding 
per student would bring risks to quality and a 
political game began in which universities and 
government competed to control the quality 
assurance process.
The initial establishment of quality assurance 
procedures by the universities was typical of many 
markets in which commercial suppliers, while 
competing fiercely with each other, collaborate to 
meet an external threat to their collective well being.
In this case the threat perceived by the universities in
1989, was government infringement of their 
autonomy by setting up an agency to monitor and 
regulate the quality of their teaching. The universities 
themselves, therefore, set up the Academic Audit 
Unit, which had the mission of ensuring that suitable 
16. Strictly speaking the score is 1-5 but level 3 is split into 3a and 3b and level 5 
is supplemented by a 5* indicating that all the research in a department is 
deemed to have reached world standards.
17. A score of 4 indicates that most of the research is deemed to have reached 
at least ‘national levels of excellence’. 
18. In 2003/4 the allocations to these 3 streams of funds in England are Teaching 
£3,400 million, Research £1,000 million, Business and the Community £58 
million.
19. In 2003/4 the amount allocated for ‘Business and the Community’ funding 
in England is £58 million, compared with £1,042 million for research and £3,399 
for teaching.
20. A useful description of the current formulae is available in hefce (2003) 
available at www.hefce.ac.ukG
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quality assurance mechanisms were in place in 
every university, and that they were operating 
effectively. In the event this did not convince the 
government of the day that it offered adequate 
safeguards for students or taxpa-yers and in 1992 
Quality Assessment Committees were established 
within the Funding Councils.21 These organised 
direct observation and monitoring of teaching in
individual teaching programmes. For a few years, 
therefore, universities, which had had little previous 
experience of external evaluation of the quality 
of their teaching, had two competitive agencies 
monitoring their teaching quality.22 In 1997 the two 
agencies were combined into the Quality Assurance 
Agency, performing a function not dissimilar from 
the regulatory agencies of the privatised public 
utilities. 
Acceptable standards of teaching, externally 
assessed, are now a condition of the receipt of 
government grant. The parallel intention to reward
universities and colleges adjudged to have 
particularly good teaching has proved more difficult 
to implement. Why should extra taxpayers’ money be
given to institutions that are already providing 
high quality teaching? This contrasts with research, 
which has led to another not entirely anticipated 
market response. There is a strong case for 
concentrating research funds where they appear 
likely to be uses most effectively. At the level of 
individual universities and departments the rewards
for research success are very considerable so 
universities have been encouraged to shift resources 
out of teaching, for which, beyond the minimum 
threshold, there are very few additional rewards, and
into research for which the financial rewards of a
high research assessment score are very considerable. 
It is possible, however, that the quality of at least 
the documentary support for students has improved 
for students as departments have sought to obtain 
high scores from their qaa inspections.
DIvERsIfIcaTIoN of fUNDINg soURcEs 
aND ITs coNsEQUENcEs
During the ten years following the 1981 cuts most
universities most universities increased their non-
government income very considerably (Williams, 
1992) and this trend has continued almost unabated 
since then. In 1979/80 over 75 per cent of the income 
of British universities came directly from the
government, the corresponding figure is now less
than 40 per cent (hesa 2003) and in several 
universities much lower. 
One consequence of this diversification of funding 
sources is that the spectrum of activity considered
legitimate for universities has broadened very 
considerably. From being institutions dedicated to 
research and high level learning teaching many 
have become quasi-commercial enterprises selling 
services in the knowledge industry to a wide range
of purchasers. This has now been formally recognised 
by the Higher Education Funding Council, which 
has recently established a third stream of public 
funding to underwrite links with business and the 
community.
Another consequence of the diversification of 
funding sources was that the active management 
of universities and polytechnics became much more 
visible. Financial management in particular was 
strengthened. Nearly all universities now have some 
kind of resource allocation model (ram),23 which is
essentially a set of formulae that constitute a planning 
and management tool for allocating resources on a 
systematic basis to each cost-centre in a university. 
Departments and centres which are not financially 
viable within their ram allocation must reduce their
costs, raise income from other sources, seek subsidy 
from the rest of the university because of their non-
financial contributions to its well-being, or become 
candidates for closure. 
rams vary from those that retain most strategic 
decisions24 as the prerogative of a central strategic 
management group within the university, allocating 
financial resources to dispersed cost centres only 
for day to day spending, to models which delegate 
most spending decisions to devolved cost centres 
while the central management group monitors only 
their overall income and expenditure position and a 
few quality indicators such as research assessment 
and teaching quality scores. Some rams mimic the
criteria used by the Funding Councils in their 
allocations to the university, and others are built up
within the institution itself based on its own 
perceptions of its mission and financial priorities 
(Jarzabkowski, 2002). 
Centralised strategy and funding of new initiatives 
but considerable devolution of authority to implement
the strategies and initiatives is now very common 
in British universities. Sometimes faculties, such as
medical schools and business schools have
21. The full story of these developments needs also to take some account of 
what was happening in the non-university sector up to 1992. The polytechnic 
and colleges sector was, until 1992, under the academic tutelage of the Council 
for National Academic Awardswhose primary function was to ensure that the 
degrees offered in polytechnics and colleges were equivalent to those in 
universities. 
22. Some had more quality regulation than this to contend with. For example 
teacher trainers were frequently and rigorously inspected by Her Majesty’s 
school inspectors.
23. In early 2000 a humane (Heads of University Management and 
Administration Network in Europe) survey of the use of resource allocation 
tools in universities showed that 80 per cent of uk higher education institutions 
used resource allocation models in the distribution of their internal resources. 
The figure has almost certainly increased since then.
24. Such as those about major new initiatives or appointment of academic and 
other staff.31
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considerable independent income generating powers, 
and it is not uncommon for business schools, for 
example, which often have close links with wealthy 
outside interests to be able to negotiate specially 
favourable terms for themselves. It is often in the 
university’s interests to do this because a successful 
business school can often bring considerable income 
into the university’s general funds even if it is ‘taxed’ 
at a relatively low rate. Other faculties, such as the 
natural sciences may, in contrast, require heavy 
subsidies from elsewhere in the university but they 
may be considered worth paying because of the 
prestige associated with a successful Physics 
department for example. 
A recent development is for many strategic 
decisions also to be devolved to faculties or ‘schools’. 
Medical schools, business schools, engineering 
schools, law schools are often powerful enough and
rich enough to be able to employ sufficient 
appropriate staff to take nearly all decisions, including 
the employment of academic staff, by themselves 
with no more than light oversight by the central 
management team to ensure that such matters as tax
and employment law, and university policies with
regard to equal opportunities are not being 
contravened. A very recent trend in university 
restructuring is to group many of the traditional arts
and sciences departments and faculties into a ‘school’ 
to which similar decision making powers can be 
devolved.
Full devolution to constituent organisational units 
is possible only in universities with a very powerful 
institutional culture that overcomes the obvious 
fissipa rous tendencies inherent in such devolution. 
(Williams, 1993). One of the most successful English 
universities, Cambridge, which has for historical 
reasons always had a very diffused decision making 
structure is beginning to question whether the 
university’s resources are used as efficiently as they
ought to be. London University, which was also 
almost completely decentralised in its financial 
decision making, effectively split apart at the 
beginning of the 1990s and the remaining powers 
of the central university are vestigial. They would 
probably disappear altogether were it not for 
the fact that legally all the degrees awarded by the 
constituent schools and colleges of the university 
are London University degrees and only one of the 
constituent schools and colleges so far has the legal 
right to award them.
One problem, which financial devolution and 
the development of rams has highlighted, is that of
over-head or indirect costs. It is, in part a technical 
accounting matter and in part a question of values 
related to fundamental ideas of why a university 
exists as an institution. As in any integrated 
organisation each of the production sub-units needs
to cover its own direct costs, make a contribution to 
the common services of the institution as a whole 
–for example the student registry, the finance office, 
information services, and to contribute funds which
can be used directly or indirectly for new 
developments. The traditional way of meeting such
indirect costs, when the majority of funding came in
the form of a single block grant from the government, 
was through ‘top-slicing’. Broadly this means that
the resources needed are top-sliced from the overall 
allocation before the remainder is allocated to the
devolved cost centres. In a market oriented university 
this procedure has two major disadvantages, first
that while the operational cost centres are subjected 
to rigorous financial discipline through the 
operation of the formulae there is perceived to be
little such discipline for the central services, second 
that they are treated as free services by the 
operating departments; for example books and 
journals are requested from the library regardless 
of cost or likely level of use. The most widely debated 
issue of this type is the use of physical space in the 
university. If classrooms and staff offices are ‘free’ 
there is an understandable incentive for each cost 
centre to demand and hold on to as much space 
as possible. Claims about under-utilised space are 
one of the main complaints of external critics of the 
management of universities. 
The most common successor to top-slicing is 
‘taxing’, though it is rarely called that. A levy is 
imposed on all income earned by departments 
whether commercially or from central funding 
through the ram. The simplest version is a 
standardised levy on all the income of each cost 
centre. This is little different from top-slicing in 
effect, but it does highlight another difficulty 
–different rates of usage of each service by different 
cost centres. A research group may claim that it
makes little use of the student registry or 
undergraduate library while a predominantly 
teaching department in the humanities may question 
the need to pay for researchers to have access to 
each new development in information technology as
soon as it comes along. An alternative is differential 
taxation, depending on the perceived intrinsic value 
to the university of any activity or its perceived 
ability to pay. Such differential taxation shades into
charging for such services as library and computing. 
In London, for example colleges now buy tickets for 
students and staff whose work requires them to use 
the university central library. The central university 
careers services are funded in much the same way. 
There are few British universities that have not had 
fierce debates about such mattersnduring the past 
two decades, and many have had several versions 
of such tax/levy/user-charging models. Many of the 
routine activities now needed to operate teaching 
and research activities are now the subject of user 
charging procedures. This is one of several areas 
of management where new technology has helped 
to make marketisation work. Postage, telephones, G
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teaching and research consumables such as paper 
and floppy discs can be charged to the individual or 
group who use them instead of being seen as a free 
bureaucratically managed service. 
As universities have come more and more to 
depend on diverse income generating activities 
to supplement and sometimes replace core income 
from government the ram has evolved into not only
a set of resource allocation formulae, but a strategic 
management tool. It is both a taxing and a spending
instrument. But in addition to the technical accounting 
issues considered in the previous paragraphs this 
raises questions that go right to the heart of the 
nature of a university as an institution. Should ‘taxes’
be proportional or progressive tax? Should those 
departments able to earn large amounts of 
commercial income be expected to pay higher taxes 
than those with fewer opportunities to do so? How 
much should the former be expected to subsidise the 
latter? Should different kinds of income generating 
activity be taxed to the same extent on in the same 
way? Some are very close to the core ‘mission’ of 
the university. For example fees from overseas 
students. These may need to cover their full costs 
in terms of all the university facilities used by such 
students. But should they go beyond this? What 
contributions should they make to the research of 
the university’s academic staff? If it is the case, as
some claim, that research and teaching are 
completely symbiotic the same proportion of their 
fees should be used to contribute to the research 
programme as the proportion of the total income of 
the university. But is this reasonable or plausible? 
Other income generating activities, some 
consultancy activities for example, or leasing out 
of physical facilities, may be seen to contribute 
little directly to the core mission of the institution. 
They may be worth doing only if they generate a 
surplus that can be used to support the mainstream 
academic activities. In these circumstances it is 
reasonable for a ram to start from the position that 
the university as a whole should retain all financial 
surpluses. However, this immediately raises the 
problem of incentives, especially for academic staff. 
Why make an effort to generate such income if there
are no benefits to the individual or to the group to 
which s/he feels primary loyalty? One solution is
to establish semi-autonomous university companies 
and consultancy units to undertake such work and 
transfer their ‘profits’ to the university. However, 
this disguises the incentives issue rather than solves 
it. There are numerous examples of ‘spin-off’
companies that have split off entirely from the 
university when their managers believe that the risks 
of failure are low enough to make it worthwhile 
retaining all the surpluses for the company rather 
than sharing them with the university. 
Intellectual property rights to discoveries made by
those working for a university are probably the
most controversial issue of all in this area. When a 
scientific discovery is poised to generate significant 
income there are usually at least three claimants 
it –the individual researchers who made the discovery, 
the university that has employed them when they 
were making it and the commercial company or 
companies that develop it from academic research 
to the product for sale. Traditionally in the uk the 
university has been squeezed between the first and 
third of these and many important discoveries have 
generated little or no income for the university25 
where the discovery was made. However, a very 
important dimension of the marketisation of the 
university has become its assertion of its rights to
a significant share income generated from the 
exploitation of the commercial rights to any 
intellectual property generated by its members. 
Cambridge University probably the most prolific 
generator of commercially exploitable intellectual 
property in the United Kingdom has been engaged 
in a fierce internal debate over this issue throughout 
2003.26 
The emergence of formula funding of universities 
by government and of rams for resource allocation 
within them are clearly indications of a very market 
oriented approach to the funding od universities. 
However it is very far from the widely quoted idea 
of a free market. Both externally and internally the 
operation of the market is very highly regulated, 
through a range of auditing and monitoring 
procedures and through a large number of 
regulatory procedures which control staff salaries, 
admission of students and, most controversially at 
the time this is being written tuition fees charged to 
undergraduate students.
THE sTUDENT fEEs IssUE
Until the 1940s universities received about one-third 
of their income from student fees (Robbins 1963). 
From then onwards the level of fees was reduced 
and an increasing proportion of them was paid 
from public funds for reasons of social equity. By 
1980 universities received less than 5 per cent of 
25. In some ways this issue is the sharpest example of the transition from 
a traditional view of the social role of the university and market economy 
view. Traditionally academic staff have competed to establish priority in the 
publication of the results of their research. That has determined their standing 
amongst their peers, their academic careers and eligibility for major scientific 
awards and prizes. Now a new consideration has appeared in many areas of 
scientific research. Results are not published until commercially exploitable 
aspects of them have been protected by patents.
26. An interesting smaller scale example where practices differ between, and 
indeed within, universities is the copyright and right to royalties on books 
written while doing research in the university. While it is usual for authors 
to be allowed to retain royalties on books they have written, this practice 
is not universal and research staff who are not on permanent contracts for 
example sometimes find that their royalties belong to the research centre that 
employed them.33
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teaching income in the form of student fees and for 
all uk students this was paid from public funds as 
part of the system of financial support for students. 
This financial support was ‘means-tested that is the 
amount a student received depended on his or her
declared family income.27 At the time some observers 
considered it anomalous that universities received 
public funds for the same activity through two 
different routes and recommended that fees should 
be consolidated into the general grant from 
government to universities and colleges. 
However, the existence of two funding streams 
was critical in 1989 when the government adopted 
a policy of low cost expansion of student numbers. 
Fees were raised to levels that covered about a 
quarter of the teaching costs of universities but they
were still to be paid out of public funds, so there 
was no opposition from students or their families. 
Universities were allowed to retain all the income 
they received from any student they recruited on a 
fees only basis and the government undertook to
meet the costs. The fees became in effect virtual 
student vouchers, which appeared to have covered 
the marginal costs of teaching additional students 
in many universities. The effect of any additional 
students recruited was, however, taken into account
in the formula determining the following year’s core 
grant to universities28 Recruiting ‘fees only’ students 
drove down the average cost per student so any 
university that did not increase its student numbers 
seriously risked losing money. The consequence 
was an explosive expansion for 6 years as universities 
competed with each other to attract as many students 
as possible. All universities, even the most elite, were 
drawn into this scramble to some extent, although 
some chose to supplement their income in other ways, 
for example by expanding the proportion of foreign 
students or postgraduate and research students.29 
By 1995 the explosive expansion of student 
numbers had proceeded to such an extent that, for
reasons indicated in section ?? above, the government 
called an abrupt halt to it and several universities and 
colleges that had based their financial plans on
continued expansion of uk student numbers 
(borrowing money to build residences for them, for
example) found themselves in serious financial trouble. 
A new Labour government replaced the 
Conservatives in 1997 but, apart from relaxing the
ceiling on student numbers and exhorting universities 
and colleges to further rapid expansion of students 
from social groups hitherto underrepresented, most
of its policies can be seen as further development of 
initiatives that were encouraged by the 1988 and 
1992 Acts. However, the 1998 Teaching and Higher 
Education Act took the market approach one step 
further by requiring the fees, which had previously 
been paid out of public funds, to be paid by the 
students themselves. This shifted about 25 per cent 
of the cost of teaching on to students and their 
families.30 The Act allowed universities to charge less 
than this tuition fee but not to charge more. 
This was also seen by many universities as a 
further move to tighten government control of the 
higher education market. Until 1998 universities 
had been able to charge any tuition fees they chose
to impose, though in practice no use was made of this
power: all universities charged their undergraduate
students the fees that the government was willing to 
reimburse. As a result of the 1998 Act Universities 
are no longer permitted to decide the fees they 
charge their eu students on first-degree courses if
they wish to continue receiving public funds. Fees
are not related to the cost of courses or to the 
anticipated financial benefits of studying different 
subjects or at different institutions.31 Fees of students 
from families with low incomes are subsidised. The 
aim is to transfer some of the burden of further 
expansion on to relatively affluent households, 
without further increasing inequality in higher 
education provision.
In February 2003 the government announced its 
intention to permit universities to charge tuition fees 
of up to three times their present level but to allow 
students to borrow the money necessary to pay 
their fees and to repay them after graduation (at 
zero real rate of interest) out of subsequent income 
once their earnings rise above average levels (DfES 
2003). At the time of writing, November 2003 the 
Queens Speech (the government policy state of its 
intentions during the year 2003/4 has announced 
30. The rationale for this decision, which had been much debated for at least 
five years, (by economists for much longer) and recommended in principle, 
though not in the precise form the government adopted, by the National 
Committee of Enquiry into Higher Education (the Dearing Committee) was the 
pressing need of many universities for more money and the government’s 
perception of the political impossibility of raising the taxes necessary to provide 
it, and the acceptance of the evidence that a very high proportion of the 
beneficiaries from higher education were students from relatively affluent 
families, most of whom were able to use their university qualifications to earn 
well above average salaries. Students from poorer families continued to have 
fees paid from public funds.
31. See Annexe 1.
27. Until 1976 the means testing arrangements were such that students from 
very wealthy families were required to pay fees themselves that covered about 
5% of their teaching costs. In that year, in a fit of misconceived equity the 
Labour government removed this requirement so that no uk student had to 
pay any fees for first-degree education. The whole issue of financial support 
for students can be seen as an aspect of the marketisation debate but in this 
paper it is considered only to the extent that it impinges on the issue of the 
income earned by universities and colleges.
28. If, for example the average public expenditure per student in year x was 
100 and in year x+1 it fell to 98 as a result of some universities recruiting ‘fees 
only’ students, that figure was used as the government’s baseline figure for 
fund allocation to universities in the latter year. The effect was that a university 
which did not increase its student numbers risked losing cash year by year.
29. For example at the London School of Economics 65% of students now 
come from outside the United Kingdom and at Imperial College London ?? % 
of the students are doing higher degrees of some sort (or the Oxbridge figure).G
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the government’s intention of passing a Law in the 
current session of Parliament to implement these 
proposals. This has raised enormous controversy in
the popular press and the issue has become a 
political football. At one end of the spectrum many
universities are claiming that that a fee of £3,000 a 
year is insufficient to meet their financial needs or to 
allow a real market for undergraduate students.
This attitude is broadly supported by the most 
popular universities, which are likely to have little
difficulty in filling all their available places even at 
very much higher fee levels. At the other extreme 
are those who believe that any fees for first-degree
studies are unethical and discriminate against students 
from less affluent backgrounds. This includes many
members of the Government (Labour) Party. They
are supported by the Liberal-Democrat centrist 
party which has traditionally opposed all charges 
for education and has a policy of raising taxation to
meet necessary costs.32 The debate was given a 
further twist in the summer of 2003 when the main 
opposition Conservative Party announced that it 
too would oppose the imposition of market-based
undergraduate fees when it is debated in Parliament 
in the Autumn of 2003. The Conservatives have 
announced that they would meet any additional 
public expenditure costs by cutting back on student 
numbers in higher education and channelling more
students into the less expensive and more vocational
Further Education sector. At the time of writing the 
outcome is very uncertain and this appears to be 
another higher education financial issue that will
be decided on extraneous political issues, such as 
the halo effect of the controversy about the Iraq war
rather than a reasoned debate about the benefits 
and costs of charging different levels of fees for first-
degree courses. The personality of the Secretary for 
State for Education may prove to be the deciding 
factor. He is very strongly staking his personal 
reputation on the equity of allowing universities to
charge higher fees to wealthy and potentially wealthy 
students. 
Another dimension of the debate is that the 
proposal is accompanied by a further tightening up 
of government regulation of the higher education 
market. In order to reduce the likelihood of students 
from poor families being excluded from attendance 
at the most popular universities the government is to 
appoint an ‘access regulator’ who will need to be
assured that any university charging more than
minimum fees to its undergraduate students, has
measures in operation to increase participation from
social groups without a strong tradition of 
participation in higher education. 
However, despite what some observers see as 
unwarranted government interference in the free 
market, uk universities remain in many respects 
remarkably independent. They are able to take most
of their own commercial and academic decisions. 
They can set their own fees for all but their bachelors 
degree courses. No formal qualifications are needed
for entry to a higher education course. Each university 
takes its own decisions about which students to admit 
and is constrained only by its market image and a 
concern to ensure that students who are admitted 
have a good probability of completing their courses 
without too much trouble and within a reasonable 
period of time. 
THE ENgLIsH ‘MoDEL’ of MaRKET oRIENTED HIgHER 
EDUcaTIoN aND ITs cURRENT DILEMMas
The term mass higher education hints at the 
deskilled production line first celebrated in Adam 
Smith’s pin factory. However, despite criticism 
of commodification, and McDonaldisation (e.g 
Hayes and Wynyard 2002) autonomous universities 
competing in a mass market may be the most 
effective way of avoiding standardised production 
line provision of academic services in the provision 
of mass higher education. The motor car industry 
has come a long way in both quality and variety 
since Henry Ford’s customers were able to have 
any colour so long as it was black and never 
has there been more variety or better quality to 
choose from, for those who like to eat in gourmet 
restaurants. In attempting to evaluate the effects 
of marketisation on British higher education it is 
important to distinguish the effects of massification, 
financial stringency and marketisation and the 
interactions between them. 
In brief the effects have been:
1.  very much greater efficiency as measured by most 
quantitative indicators;
2. much expanded and less distinct boundaries of 
both ‘the university’ and higher education;
3. diversification with standardisation of processes 
and outcomes within similar categories of activity;
4. radical changes in management arrangements 
within higher education institutions;
5. changes in the social and economic position of 
academic staff.
EffIcIENcy
Unambiguous measures of efficiency in higher 
education are beset with difficulty arising from 
difficulties of defining output and quality. Any 
quantitative measures are, therefore, at best indicators 
of changes that appear to have occurred in relation
32. In Scotland, where the Liberal Democrats formed part of the government 
coalition, fees were abolished in 2000, though a graduate endowment scheme, 
in which graduates are expected to reimburse the higher education sector as 
a whole after graduation, has much the same effect from the point of view of 
individuals.35
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to specific policy or management objectives. With this
important proviso in mind there are many indicators 
that the unit of output per unit of input has increased 
considerably, at least in terms of overt public policy 
objectives, during the past 15 years.
As Annexe 1 shows the percentage of young 
people entering higher education in England rose 
from less than 15 per cent in 1980 to well over 30 per
cent in 2000. The White Paper of 2003 claims the 
proportion is now 43 per cent. In Scotland and 
Northern Ireland the figures were higher in both 
years. Over the same period public expenditure per
student fell by nearly 35 per cent in real terms. The 
percentage of gdp devoted to higher education 
institutions fell from ?? per cent to ?? per cent 
between 19?? and 200?. These did not, however, lead
to a discernible significant losses of quality. Course 
completion rates remain high, despite the creation of 
a new group of universities in 1992 and the uk now
has the highest age related graduation rate in the 
oecd area. There is no quantitative evidence that the 
quality of these graduates has fallen. Recent figures 
suggest that the economic benefits of graduation 
remain high as Annexe 4 shows. At the same
time research output remains high. The publications 
rate of academics in the United Kingdom and the 
citation rates of these publications in recognised 
academic journals remains high. Quantitative 
indicators leave little doubt, therefore, that the 
changes have been successful.
However, there are questions about the ‘quality’ 
of degrees. Although it is not often disputed that the 
standards achieved by the best graduates are at least
as high as they have always been, there are concerns 
about the range of performance between the top and
bottom graduates: between those who are 
immediately able to go on to successfully complete 
doctoral programmes for example, and those who 
just mange to scrape a pass at bachelors level. These
are very difficult questions to answer especially since 
there are issues both of ranges of performance 
within single subjects and disciplines and between 
disciplines. But further work is clearly needed before 
we can confidently assert that the regulated market 
has improved efficiency without detrimental effects 
on quality.
BoUNDaRIEs of HIgHER EDUcaTIoN
The boundaries of higher education have expanded 
along three dimensions. 
a. The creation of new universities out of former 
polytechnics and colleges took place within the 
boundaries of what was conventionally know as 
higher education but simultaneously there has 
been a substantial expansion of higher education 
courses, including many two-year programmes, 
in lower level further education colleges. 
b. New subjects have entered the higher education 
curriculum, professional areas such as nursing 
and tourism and quasi-professional areas such as 
media studies.
c. The traditional core missions of teaching and 
research have been supplemented by a wide range
of activities that are in part similar to the 
longstanding public service function of United 
States universities but there can be little doubt 
that the massive expansion of such work in British 
universities in the past two decades has been 
primarily market driven. A process whereby an 
activity, for example links with local industry, is 
embarked on, initially as a way of generating 
income through, research, consultancy or contract 
teaching has gradually become mainstream, 
partly because of the need to offer career 
prospects for the staff who engage in it, so that 
by the mid-1990s the higher education funding 
councils recognised such work and introduced a 
new stream of government to underpin it.33 
 
DIvERsIfIcaTIoN, sTaNDaRDIsaTIoN aND EQUITy
British higher education is not more standardised 
overall than it was in the 1970s. Twenty years ago
I wrote ‘In universities students are offered effectively 
a three or four years honours degree or nothing’ 
(Williams & Blackstone 1983). A similar claim could 
not be made today. Yet the effects of the quality 
assurance movement has been to ensure that within
each category of higher education activity the 
experience of students is under pressure to converge 
regardless of where they are studying the subject. 
Subject specific curriculum development groups 
are attempting to ensure that what is taught on 
undergraduate history courses is equivalent in all 
universities and the pressure is even greater where 
professional qualifications are involved. Teacher 
training courses, for example, have been virtually 
standardised across the whole of England. 
Standardised products often appear in a mass 
market because customers find them convenient. 
A mid-range family saloon meets a certain range 
of expectation with respect to engine power, safety, 
comfort, and a franchised chain of restaurants can 
be relied on to meet known quality standards. The
more complex the product the more valuable to 
many consumers is the knowledge that there are
guaranteed standards. A measure of standardisation 
in higher education is particularly useful to students 
without a family tradition of going to university or
33. At the national macro-economic level this stream of funding has been 
justified on the grounds that it facilitates technology transfer from the 
university laboratory to the production line, but there is little convincing evince 
that many such activities actually do so.G
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attendance at a secondary school with close links to
several universities. The transaction costs of acquiring 
information about an individualised product are 
otherwise too high for many students. 
In most markets there is a range of standards 
between which customers can choose. Usually there
is a trade-off between quality and price. In the United 
Kingdom, at least rhetorically, equity in higher 
education has tended to mean not that students 
should be aware of the implications of attendance at 
different universities but that they should have a
broadly similar experience whichever higher 
education institution they attend. Many countries 
continue to have at least two explicit higher education 
product ranges. In the uk the binary system was 
abandoned and a unified system created because it
was believed that two explicit product ranges 
conflicted with principles of equity if access to the 
preferred model was restricted.
uk higher education policies in the 1990s have 
attempted to find solutions to the problem of 
coexistence of diversity and equity mainly through 
diversity within universities. The competitive 
financial mechanisms promoted by government 
have had the consequence of encouraging most 
universities to try to offer courses and research 
across a very wide range of subjects and types of 
student, partly because some activities –research for
example– are perceived as being potentially more 
rewarding to the university and its staff, than others. 
Many proposals for squaring the diversity-equity 
circle have been made in the past ten years and 
several were aired in the recent government White 
Paper (DfES 2003). One is for students to be well
informed about the implications of particular choices
and to pay, at least proportionately, for what they get.
Another is for universities to cross subsidise some 
students, or some activities, at the expense of 
others.34 Some universities may be able to succeed in
one market niche, others somewhere else. Some 
may attempt to generate a financial surplus through 
ventures that are not part of the core university 
mission but can be used to subsidise it. Thus 
students at a university that makes profits from the 
conference trade, for example, are able to benefit 
from a more expensive range of services.
However, as soon as either of these happens 
there is an inherent conflict between diversity and 
equity. Diversity and differentiation must mean that
the missions and clientele of courses differ. Whatever 
the intentions, some students will get better 
financial deals than others. If the prices to students 
of all courses are required to be equal some will 
receive better value for money than others. If prices 
(tuition fees) are allowed to differ some will not be
able to afford the higher priced options. If the 
government decides to provide extra subsidy to
students in institutions that do not generate 
additional income this is a deterrent to enterprise and 
thus a net loss of income to the sector as a whole.
cHaNgEs IN MaNagEMENT
The explicit ‘marketisation’ of British higher education 
was largely a series of responses to immediate 
crises. Even the ‘National Enquiry into the Future 
of Higher Education’ (Dearing, 1997) was mainly 
concerned with finding ways of dealing with 
immediate crises of funding and quality assurance. 
Counter-factual history is not a very useful exercise 
but it is of some interest to reflect on what might 
have happened if universities that not been 
autonomous institutions at that time of the 1981 cuts 
and subsequently and had depended on prescribed 
line item budgets from government.
What is not hypothetical is that when mass 
higher education and the global growth of belief in
markets as efficient ways of allocating resources 
and promoting economic advance led to the growth
of the new public management concept of ‘steering 
from a distance’ by government, British universities 
were in a uniquely privileged position to take 
advantage of the new circumstances. Unfortunately 
for them, however, whereas in many other countries 
steering from a distance involved loosening rigid
state control mechanisms, in the uk the emphasis 
was on the strengthening of government instruments 
to steer the system. Among other measures this has 
involved attempts to strengthen the non-academic 
control of universities and colleges so as to reduce 
their ability to serve what the government has seen 
as academic self-interest.
Many British universities are now very large 
commercial enterprises and need, at least in part, to
be run as such. Business acumen is now at least as
important as academic expertise for their top 
managers. The changes that have been experienced 
over the past twenty years are obviously not unique
to the United Kingdom. They are part of a global 
trend of which the most dramatic manifestation 
was the downfall of the centrally planned economies 
of Eastern Europe. However, the British tradition of
university autonomy elicited a particular kind of
response when universities were subjected to severe 
financial reductions in the early 1980s. There have, for
example, virtually no full scale privatisation in British
higher education because the universities have
already had the legal status of private organisations, so
any successful initiative by a private organisation can
immediately be taken up by an existing university 
which has the advantages of existing market visibility. 
34. For example it is expected that the requirements of the ‘access regulator’ 
will be met by offering some kind of means tested bursaries for students from 
less wealthy families. The cost of these will have to come either directly or 
indirectly from the students who are paying the higher fees.37
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In many ways, therefore, British higher education 
was a soft target for governments wishing to control
public expenditure. The funding of universities was
already partly quasi-market in form, in that financially 
autonomous universities received public funds and 
spent them in accordance with their own priorities. 
One problem in the eyes of governments since 1980, 
has been that these priorities have not coincided 
with those that the government considered to be 
the interests of the community as a whole. 
It gave rise to an interest in the ‘the principal-
agent problem’. How does the ‘principal’ or supplier 
of resources ensure that the ‘agent’ acts in a way 
that the principal requires? How do managers or
leaders ensure that the individuals and organisations 
for which they are responsible behave in ways that 
the managers require? The answer is in one of five 
ways: coercion, administrative or legal authority, 
charismatic persuasion, professional expertise or the
provision of incentives. For a wide variety of 
technical, economic and ideological reasons, related 
to organisational size, the tendency of middle level
bureaucrats and professionals to act in their own
self interests, and belief in individualistic democracy 
as the ultimate source of authority in society, there 
has been a growing tendency to treat the last of these, 
the provision of incentives, as the most efficient 
way for principals to ‘persuade’ agents to achieve 
outcomes desired by the principals. 
British universities have begun to experience the 
growth of what might be called entrepreneurial 
management. The rewards of financial success for 
or within the university have risen and the penalties 
of failure have become more severe. One indicator 
is the widening salary gap between those at the top
of academic hierarchies and those at the base. 
Vicechancellors’ salaries have risen very much more
rapidly than average academic salaries in the last ten 
years. There has been a huge increase in part time, 
short-term research and teaching staff, many of 
whom have poor career prospects. Unsurprisingly 
many such employees are women. 
Underpinning the success of new public 
management were the dramatic changes brought 
about by the rapid developments of information 
technology. These had several effects on British 
higher education. 
One is the acceleration of changes that have been 
happening for the past three hundred years –the 
speeding up of global communications. Information 
about successful (and unsuccessful) innovations can
be round the world in a matter of minutes. 
Evaluations of the causes of success or failure are 
usually not far behind. Information and knowledge 
are as susceptible to such developments as manual 
work was to the harnessing of steam, petrogas and
electrical energy in earlier centuries. This is especially 
relevant to higher education, which is one of the 
leading information industries. The worldwide use
of the English language has given British universities 
particular opportunities and challenges in this area. 
It accentuates the need for them to respond rapidly 
changing demands and they were early adopters of 
advanced electronic information systems. 
A second consequence of the rapid changes in 
information technology is simply that both collegial 
and bureaucratic management arrangements are 
too slow to keep pace with the pace of change. The
Soviet economy in the l970s and 1980s fell back 
further and further in comparison with those that 
were able to respond quickly to technological change.
This is particularly relevant to higher education 
with its long production period and long-term 
effects throughout the lifetimes of its participants. 
Outdated universities can continue to do damage 
for many decades. It was the shock of the 1981 cuts 
and the realisation that they were not going to be 
reversed after the 1984 election that accelerated the
growth of modern management information systems 
in most universities. No longer was it possible for 
university managers to buy themselves out of
difficulties when problems arose –easing out 
unsuccessful appointees, building or renting 
additional space when in other parts of the university
lecture rooms were underutilised. It was essential to
foresee such crises rather than simply responding 
to them when they arose. The new information 
technology enabled senior managers to keep their 
fingers on the pulse of the universities while 
devolving most of the day to day decisions to those
who were directly involved. Although this applied to 
nearly all areas of business activity it is particularly 
powerful in enterprises like universities where 
much of the expertise necessary for the successful 
operation of the organisation is near the base of the 
organisational hierarchy.
In practice almost certainly, the most important 
contribution as a proximate cause of the development
of a tightly regulated market in British higher 
education, is the implications of information 
technology for management information systems. 
The development of high powered systems for the
creation, transmission, storage and retrieval of
management information has meant that 
governments and senior university managers have 
been able to avoid detailed administrative controls, 
while at the same time increasing their capacity to 
steer systems and institutions in directions indicated 
by their own policy priorities. The concept of 
controlling a system or organisation by the 
manipulation of management information is the main
way in complex systems like higher education can be 
“steered from a distance”. An essential feature of
effective markets is the unimpeded flow of 
information and this is equally important to those 
who seek to regulate them. The sophisticated rams 
referred to in this article, which are at the heart 
of successful universities responses to financial G
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stringency, government steering from a distance and 
producing usable financial surpluses from a diverse 
variety of income sources, would have been quite 
impossible without sophisticated computerised 
information systems.
THE acaDEMIc PRofEssIoN
It is a widespread belief among university 
teachers in the United Kingdom that the efficiency 
improvements of the past two decades have been 
achieved at the expense of the academic staff.
Indicators that support these claims are the increased 
workloads resulting from larger numbers of students 
per teacher, regular appraisals of teaching and 
research, declining relative rates of remuneration 
and less security of employment. Claims of stress are
widespread. The consumerist view of higher 
education is that the aim of higher education is not 
to secure attractive lifestyles for its employees and 
certainly it was one of the claims of government in the 
1980s that many of the resources devoted to higher
education were used more to meet the demands of 
academic staff than to improve the education of 
students. However, at some point reductions in the
net benefits of any profession affects rates of entry
into it. This effect can be both quantitative and
qualitative. Quantitatively it may become impossible 
to fill job vacancies. There is evidence that this point
has already been reach in some specialist areas, such
as Economics, Electronic Engineering, and in 
professional areas such as Law and Accountancy 
where the market demands of other employers are 
very high. 
But even more of a threat to higher education, 
partly because it is more difficult to measure are the
quality shortages. If a sufficient number from the best
of each generation of graduates do not become 
researchers and teachers in higher education there is 
a serious danger of slow long term quality decline. 
The threat is insidious because its effects are slow and 
often not objectively measurable, at least not from 
one year to the next. It is widely believed that such
changes are occurring at least in some specialisms.
MaKINg sENsE of THE UK “MoDEL” of HIgHER 
EDUcaTIoN MaRKETIsaTIoN
This paper has outlined the unfolding of a story with
five interwoven strands: financial stringency, 
organisational responses, expansion, quality control 
and information technology. Together they have 
brought about the phenomenon that is often 
described as marketisation, though other neologisms
are often used: massification, commodification, 
McDonaldisation for example. It is my claim that 
though these five strands are woven together it is 
possible to discern a clear set of causal connections 
if the text is read carefully and the temptation to put 
higher education always at the centre of the picture 
is resisted. It is also necessary to bear in mind that
any unfolding narrative, which is dynamic by 
definition, must start somewhere even though there 
are inevitably antecedents. 
A synopsis of the story told in this paper is 
that the events started in 1979 with the election of 
a Conservative government pledged to overcome 
inflation by reducing public expenditure. Each 
government department was required to make 
savings specified in an overall macroeconomic target, 
immediately, and over the following five years. A 
convenient immediate target was the subsidy paid to
higher education institutions on account of their 
foreign students about which there had previously 
been concern because of their rapid growth, in part
promoted by universities to make good their 
shortfalls in home student recruitment in the 1970s 
which had fallen short of targets from the early 
1970s onwards. These shortfalls also made higher 
education a prime target by the Department of 
Education and Science for a major part of its 
contribution to the required public expenditure 
savings. 
As financially independent institutions the 
immediate university responses were mixed. Some 
assumed that the cuts were a once for all surgical 
operation and recovery of the long established status 
quo ante would be rapid. Others adapted to the new
situation very quickly and realised that the golden 
post war age of government generosity to the 
universities was over and that new sources of 
finance had to be found. They set about actively 
recruiting students from overseas, particularly the
boom middle eastern and Asian countries and 
exploring other ways they could turn their knowledge 
and skills into income streams for the university.
In 1984, partly as a result of success in the 
Falklands War the Conservative government was
re-elected with an increased majority and it became
widely realised that the policy of financial stringency 
across the public sector would be a permanent 
feature of the uk political scene. All universities 
now realised that income generation from other 
sources was essential if they were to survive.
Consensual collegial management structures were no
longer able to perform effectively in the new climate. 
Committees were pruned, finance offices became
larger and more powerful, central management 
teams were established, primitive computerised 
resource allocation models were developed. Clearly 
universities were proving capable of looking after 
themselves financially.
Inevitably in a narrative that depended on 
decisions by many independent organisations 
various problems developed along the way. Two were
important enough to have had an important role in 
the next big event in the story. Many universities 
were unable to make the staff reductions they wished39
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because nearly all their academic staff had lifetime 
tenure. The government was persuaded to provide 
additional funds to permit this flexibility. The other
was a suspicion that some of the income generating 
activities were being subsidised out of public funds in
that the universities were not charging for the
indirect costs of these activities. The 1988 Education
Reform Act took for granted the ability of 
universities’ financial management to adapt to 
financial diversification but in order to make them
more effective tenure was abolished and a funding
mechanism was introduced in which the government 
effectively bought teaching and research services 
from the universities, rather than subsidising them. 
The costs of providing teaching and research in each
university was carefully monitored. The universities 
were encouraged to expand their new found 
enthusiasm for raising cash from sources other than 
government. 
Meanwhile the oecd had started to produce 
reliable international comparisons of higher 
education performance and two headline figures 
soon became widely know politically. The United 
Kingdom had very low participation rates and high 
course completion rates compared with most other 
wealthy oecd countries and public expenditure was 
very high –a typical elitist higher education system 
underpinned by state funding. 
By the mid 1990s the rate of expansion was 
causing total expenditure on higher education to rise
rapidly despite large falls in spending per student. The
Treasury insisted on a freeze on further expansion
and many institutions which had borrowed money 
for buildings and equipment in the expectation that 
growth would continue found themselves in severe 
financial difficulty.35 
The debate about whether part of the cost should 
be borne by graduates who were on average 
receiving considerable financial benefits from higher
education began in earnest. This threatened to 
become a major issue in the 1997 election and a
National Committee of Enquiry into Higher Education
was set up with a timetable that meant it would not
report till after the election. The Dearing Committee’s 
report appeared in 1997 a few weeks after the new 
Labour government had been elected with a large 
parliamentary majority. The Dearing Committee 
recommended that the tuition fee component of
teaching costs should be paid by graduates in the 
form of income contingent repayment of loans 
available to them as students. This was not, however, 
acceptable to the government in part because it was
thought that wealthier families ought to be able to
pay the fees for their children immediately and partly 
because a loan scheme would not make additional 
money available to the universities for several years. 
Four main higher education issues concerned 
the new government that was re-elected in 2002. 
•	 The	emergence	of	different	approaches	in	Scotland	
and Wales where the voting system put in place 
had led to a coalition style of government began 
to influence thinking in England. 
•	 In	world	where	acquisition	and	transfer	of	
advanced knowledge was seen as essential if a 
country was to remain wealthy it was considered 
essential to increase spending on research and 
to ensure that it was spent effectively on both the 
creation and the transfer of knowledge.
•	 Lifelong	learning	was	essential	if	individuals	were
to keep pace with the rapid changes in knowledge 
that scientific discoveries were rendering 
inevitable;
•	 The	benefits	of	higher	education	needed	to	be	
spread to all segments of the population. 
The White Paper that was published at the beginning 
of 2003 proposed further concentration of research 
funding, financial incentives to higher education 
institutions to recruit students from schools where 
the tradition of higher education entry is not strongly 
entrenched, increased contributions to the long 
term costs by graduates by permitting universities 
to charge considerably higher fees and for these to 
be paid out of the subsequently enhanced income of
graduates. The debate about these proposals is
currently under way and some of them have already
been strongly criticised by a parliamentary committee. 
They will be debated in Parliament in November 
and the outcomes are far from certain. Political 
alliances are forming which are likely to depend as 
much on attitudes to the government formed as a 
reaction to the Iraq war as on their intrinsic merit.
 
coNcLUDINg REMaRK
Although the move towards market forms of 
organisation began early in the United Kingdom it is 
important to remember in the context of the history 
of British universities how recent it is. In 1989 the 
Higher Education Quarterly opened a themed issue 
on marketing higher education with the thought that: 
‘This issue of the Quarterly will probably shock some 
readers. The idea of marketing a university is about 
as far from Newman and von Humboldt, or, for that 
matter Bloom and Bok, as it is possible to get.’ 
Undoubtedly ideology underpinned the changes 
described in this paper, both their formulation and 
their implementation. ‘Changing the culture’ was 
the watchword of many senior university managers 
throughout the 1990s. However, in the United 
35. Another non-education matter that is of prime importance for a financially 
autonomous university is the interest it must pay on borrowed money and this 
depends in part on the stae of the national economy and the institution’s own 
credit rating (See Standard and Poors 2003).G
a
r
e
t
h
 
W
i
l
l
i
a
m
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
H
i
g
h
e
r
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
,
 
p
p
.
 
2
4
-
4
2
.
Kingdom it was primarily an ideology that had its 
roots outside higher education and it was tempered 
by political necessities and opportunities. The initial 
driver was scepticism about the efficiency of
centrally provided public services and a growing 
unwillingness, expressed through the adversarial 
political process, to pay taxes for them. In such a
situation the market becomes an attractive alternative
way of providing a very wide range of services. 
Universities, which had always been legally and 
financially autonomous institutions, protected by a 
very strong belief that this is an essential protection 
of intellectual freedom, were easy targets for public
expenditure cuts and pressures to find supplementary 
and alternative sources of finance. The rest of the 
story is essentially one of university responses and 
government reactions to these responses. 
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aNEXo
Number of students by level of course and mode of study
age Participation Index (api) by gender (1979-99)G
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Earnings Premia associated with Different HEIs 1995
Source: How the HEFCE allocates its funds 2003 Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (2003).
Returns to education
Source: Blondal et al (2002).
RaE ratings converted into funding weights 
for each assessment. 2002 RaE rating The three subject cost weights are: